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Access to finance is an important determinant of
economic growth (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Beck,
Levine and Loayza, 2000). But it is also thought to
advance democracy and human rights, as the Nobel
Committee stated in 2006 when it awarded the No-
bel Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus and his Gra-
meen Bank “for their efforts to create economic and
social development from below” (Nobel Prize Com-
mittee, 2006). The fact that group lending schemes,
such as that of Grameen Bank, have become so im-
portant in developing countries demonstrates that in
these countries there is market failure on the credit
market. The source of market failure is asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders, which
makes lenders reluctant to extend credit. There are
institutions that help to overcome these problems of
asymmetric information and support a functioning
credit market.They,however,are often lacking in de-
veloping countries.
Asymmetric information on credit markets
The fundamental problem on the credit market is re-
lated to asymmetric information between borrower
and lender. The resulting problems are classified as
adverse selection, ex ante and ex post moral hazard.
Adverse selection arises because the borrowers can,
at the time they apply for a loan, better evaluate the
risks of their venture and thereby their own credit-
worthiness.After a loan is granted,the borrowers de-
cide whether to spend the loan in the way agreed
upon with the bank or not. However, since the lend-
ers cannot oversee how the borrowers deal with the
money, an ex ante moral hazard problem arises.When
the repayments are due and the borrowers have the
financial means to repay the loan,they decide wheth-
er to repay or to default strategically. Since the lend-
ers cannot determine whether the borrowers are not
able to repay or do not want to repay,there is ex post
moral hazard.
Of course, many remedies have been developed to
overcome the problems resulting from asymmetric
information by designing a particular contract struc-
ture. One of them is collateral (see, for instance, the
papers by Bester 1985; Besanko and Thakor 1987;
Boot, Thakor and Udell 1991). However, this re-
quires that the borrowers possess sufficient pledge-
able assets.All those potential borrowers that do not
have sufficient collateralizable wealth will not re-
ceive loans. This argument shows that contractual
features are not able to fully solve the problems re-
sulting from asymmetric information.Therefore, the
solution should be to at least reduce the underlying
“evil”, asymmetric information.
Through the business relationship between the bank
and the firm, the bank obtains more and more in-
sight into the borrower’s business conduct and can
better evaluate the firm’s creditworthiness (for a re-
view of the literature, see Boot 2000). Thus, a rela-
tionship reduces the degree of asymmetric informa-
tion between these two parties.At the same time,the
relationship bank is better informed about the firm
than other, so-called outside, banks are. This means
that the offers outside banks make are based on the
information asymmetry between them and the bor-
rower.However,the offer the relationship bank makes
will be influenced by the offers a borrower can find on
the market. Consequently, the relationship bank can
exploit its information advantage by demanding high-
er interest rates than it could otherwise, given the
information it possesses about the borrower – the
borrower is “held up” by the bank. Thus, to funda-
mentally improve the situation on the credit market
one must reduce asymmetric information between a
borrower and all its potential lenders.
1 I would like to thank Martin Brown for helpful discussions.
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The idea underlying information sharing it that “the
best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour”
(Miller 2003, p. 25) In practice, it is an arrangement
by which lenders contribute information about their
customers to a common pool which is accessible to
all lenders that contribute. Economists focus on in-
formation asymmetries in credit markets but so far
have paid little attention to its institutional aspects,
which is information sharing (Miller 2003).
In the literature the effects of information sharing on
adverse selection and on moral hazard have been
studied.The first paper on the exchange of informa-
tion through private credit registries was published
by Pagano and Jappelli (1993). In an adverse selec-
tion model, the banks, which are local monopolies,
benefit from an information exchange through de-
clining default rates.The authors also show that bank
competition makes information sharing less likely
because it reduces the informational rent a bank can
extract in the “hold-up” situation. Incumbent banks
can influence the degree of market entry by their
decision to share information either on the borrow-
er type or on his performance in the past, such as
project outcomes or defaulting. In fact, banks will
choose the type of information they provide strate-
gically to deter entry (Boukaert and Degryse 2006).
For instance, for intermediate degrees of adverse se-
lection, the relationship bank can limit the scope of
entry by revealing the outcome of the first period,
but not the type of firm.
Padilla and Pagano (1997) use a moral hazard frame-
work in which banks generate rents from high quality
borrowers in the first period of a two-period lending
relationship.In this setup,the bank has an incentive to
reveal information about the firm’s type after the first
period.The reason is that banks compete more fierce-
ly in the second period if there is information sharing.
Thus, the firms receive a higher return and, therefore,
they have a stronger incentive to exert effort.This in-
creases their quality, and the rent a bank extracts in
the first period rises. In a companion paper, Padilla
and Pagano (2000) study the case where rents are
competed away ex ante. In this case, it is better to
show information only about the outcome of a project
but not the borrower type because the firms’ incen-
tives to work hard are thereby the strongest.2
The effect of information sharing can best be ob-
served in a laboratory. Brown and Zehnder (2007)
find that information sharing disciplines borrowers if
repayments are not enforceable. However, if there is
a bilateral bank relationship,information sharing has
no additional effect on the repayment behavior.Thus,
it does not perform better than relationship banking.
Kallberg and Udell (2003) use data at the firm-level
from the world’s largest private credit bureau, Dun
& Bradstreet. They show that the information from
the credit bureau has significant predictive power in
a failure prediction model and goes beyond the in-
formation contained in the firms’ financial state-
ments. More indirect evidence comes from firm- or
country-level studies that show how the presence of
information-sharing arrangements influences access
to finance. Using firm-level surveys from transition
countries, Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009) show
that information sharing is positively correlated with
access to credit and its perceived costs.They also find
that for access to finance accounting transparency of
the individual firm and the existence of information-
sharing arrangements are substitutes.At the country
level information sharing seems to be a substitute for
the protection of creditor rights. Similar results are
obtained in cross-country studies of aggregate cred-
it. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) demonstrate that in-
formation sharing is positively associated with bank
lending to GDP. They can also determine whether
information is about a borrower’s default, being in
arrears or includes additional information, such as
debt exposure. Both types of information seem to
influence financial intermediation positively.Djankov
et al. (2007) use a large data set for 129 countries
showing that information-sharing arrangements are
associated with a higher ratio of private credit to
GDP.They also study the effect of introducing infor-
mation-sharing arrangements and find that subse-
quently the ratio of private credit to GDP rises.
Measuring information sharing on credit markets
The Doing Business initiative of the World Bank
provides an excellent source of information for
many business regulations and also for information
sharing. For the information-sharing arrangements
Doing Business gathers these data in two steps. In a
first step, they find out whether there is a public
credit registry or a private credit information bureau
present in a country by contacting bank supervision
authorities and public information sources. If this is
the case, then in a second step, the credit registries
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and credit bureaus are surveyed with respect to their
structure and their legal basis. The information ob-
tained from the surveys is checked by the Doing
Business team (World Bank 2010).
There are two quantitative measures of information-
sharing arrangements: the private credit bureau cov-
erage and the public credit registry coverage. There
is also an indicator summarizing qualitative informa-
tion: the depth of credit information index. We use
the World Bank’s terminology to differentiate be-
tween private and public information-sharing ar-
rangements.“A private credit bureau is defined as a
private firm or nonprofit organization that maintains
a database on the creditworthiness of borrowers (per-
sons or businesses) in the financial system and facil-
itates the exchange of credit in-
ormation among banks and finan-
cial institutions. Credit investiga-
tive bureaus and credit reporting
firms that do not directly facili-
tate information exchange among
banks and other financial institu-
tions are not considered. […] A
public credit registry is defined as a
database managed by the public
sector, usually by the central bank
or the superintendent of banks,
that collects information on the
creditworthiness of borrowers (per-
sons or businesses) in the financial
system and makes it available to
financial institutions”(World Bank
2010).The information of the pub-
lic credit registries is also used by
the supervisory authorities. The
role information sharing plays in
bank supervision goes beyond the
scope of this article.
The coverage provided by either
a private credit bureau or a pub-
lic credit registry varies between
0,if a credit bureau or a credit re-
gistry is not in place,and 100.The
coverage in the Table “reports the
number of individuals and firms
listed by a private credit bureau
[or a public credit registry] with
information on repayment histo-
ry,unpaid debts or credit outstand-
ing from the past five years. The
number is expressed as a percent-
age of the adult population (the
population aged 15 and above according to the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators 2009)”(World
Bank 2010).
In addition to the quantitative indicators,there is also
the index capturing the depth of credit information.It
measures “rules affecting the scope, accessibility and
quality of credit information available through either
public or private credit registries. A score of 1 is as-
signed for each of the following six features of the
public registry or the private credit bureau (or both):
• Both positive credit information (for example,
loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments)
and negative information (for example, late pay-










2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Austria  39.3    39.2    1.1    1.4    6  6 
Belgium 0.0    0.0    53.3    56.5 4  4 
Bulgaria 0.0    6.2    1.3    34.8 3  6 
Cyprus 0.0    0.0    0 
Czech Republic 24.9 73.1 2.1 4.9 4 5
Denmark 7.1    5.2    0.0    0.0    4  4 
Estonia  9.5    20.6    0.0    0.0    5  5 
Finland 14.8    14.7    0.0    0.0    5  5 
France  0.0    0.0    1.7    32.5 4  4 
Germany  85.6    98.3    0.6    0.8    6  6 
Greece  11.1    46.9    0.0    0.0    4  5 
Hungary  3.3    10.3    0.0    0.0    5  5 
Ireland 100.0    100.0    0.0    0.0    5  5 
Italy   57.1    77.5    7.9    12.2 6  5 
Latvia 0.0    0.0    0.6    46.5 2  5 
Lithuania 18.4    4.4    12.1 3  6 
Luxembourg 0.0    0.0    0 
Netherlands 64.5    83.5    0.0    0.0    5  5 
Poland 38.0    68.3    0.0    0.0    4  4 
Portugal 7.9    16.4    63.7    81.3 5  5 
Romania  0.0    30.2    0.4    5.7    4  5 
Slovak Republic 44.0    0.6    1.4    3  4 
Slovenia 0.0    0.0    2.5    2.7    3  2 
Spain 6.5    7.6    39.4    45.3 5  5 
Sweden 98.0    100.0    0.0    0.0    4  4 
United Kingdom 100.0    0.0    0.0    6  6 
Croatia  0.0    77.0    0.0    0.0    0  4 
Macedonia 0.0    0.6    28.1 3  4 
Norway  100.0    100.0    0.0    0.0    4  4 
Switzerland 23.3    22.5    0.0    0.0    5  5 
Turkey  30.0    42.9    3.2    15.9 5  5 
Australia  95.4    100.0    0.0    0.0    5  5 
Canada 100.0    100.0    0.0    0.0    6  6 
Japan 61.5    76.2    0.0    0.0    6  6 
New Zealand 97.8    100.0    0.0    0.0    5  5 
UnitedStates 100.0    100.0    0.0    0.0    6  6 
Empty cells: Data not available.
 Source: World Bank (2010).• Data on both firms and individuals are distrib-
uted.
• Data from retailers,trade creditors or utility com-
panies as well as financial institutions are distrib-
uted.
• More than two years of historical data are distrib-
uted. Registries that erase data on defaults as
soon as they are repaid obtain a score of 0 for this
indicator.
• Data on loans below 1 percent of income per ca-
pita are distributed.A registry must have a mini-
mum coverage of 1 percent of the adult popula-
tion to score a 1 for this indicator.
• Regulations guarantee borrowers the right to
access their data in the largest registry in the
economy” (World Bank 2010).
Accordingly, the value of this index ranges from 0 to
6.The higher the value of the index, the more credit
information is available from the private or the pub-
lic information-sharing arrangements. In countries
without any information-sharing arrangements the
index is set at 0.3
In the Table we list the three indicators for 36 OECD
and EU countries for the years 2005 and 2010.Among
these countries seven do not have a private credit
bureau. In eight countries the whole population is
covered by a credit bureau. The other countries are
spread in between without any particular pattern.
Compared with the year 2005 the coverage of pri-
vate credit bureaus increased significantly in several
countries. In particular, in the new EU member
states in eastern Europe the credit bureaus that did
not exist before transition started in 1989 expanded
their coverage (often significantly).
The figures for public credit reg-
istry coverage are quite different
from those of the credit bureau.
In 20 out of the 36 countries a public credit registry
does not exist.There is no country in which the total
population is covered by a credit registry. Coverage
is highest in Portugal with 81.3 percent. In many
countries the coverage is at the one-digit level. This
probably reflects the fact that the threshold levels
above which loans must be reported to the credit
registry are quite high (Jappelli and Pagano 2003).
There seems to be a clear influence of legal origin
because in the Anglo-American countries no public
credit registries exist.The coverage of the public cre-
dit registries has increased relative to 2005. Again,
coverage went up in the new EU-27 member states.
But the figures for France, Italy, Portugal and Spain
are higher in 2010 than in 2005, too.
One could ask whether private credit bureaus and
public credit registries are complements or substitutes.
There is no clear answer to this question.Miller (2003)
argues that they are complements, whereas Pagano
and Jappelli (2003) that they are substitutes. Figure 1
illustrates the relationship between the two informa-
tion-sharing arrangements for our set of 36 countries.
There are some countries (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Slo-
venia) which have hardly any information sharing. In
all the other countries there is at least one form of
information sharing. In those countries that do not
have a private credit bureau a substantial fraction of
the population is covered by a public credit registry.
For the depth of credit information index most coun-
tries have a score between 4 and 6.Values below are
due to the (nearly complete) absence of information
arrangements in these countries. Those with a score
of 4 include some new EU-27 members, some Scan-
dinavian countries, Belgium, France and Portugal.
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3 The World Bank (2010) explains the
functioning of the indicator as follows:
“In Turkey,for example,both a public and
a private registry operate. Both distribute
positive and negative information (a
score of 1).The private bureau distributes
data only on individuals, but the public
registry covers firms as well as individuals
(a score of 1).The public and private reg-
istries share data among financial institu-
tions only; no data are collected from
retailers or utilities (a score of 0).The pri-
vate bureau distributes more than two
years of historical data (a score of 1).The
public registry collects data on loans of $
3,493 (44 percent of income per capita) or
more, but the private bureau collects
information on loans of any value (a
score of 1). Borrowers have the right to
access their data in both the private and
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Except for the new EU-27 member states, which
have improved the quality of their information-shar-
ing arrangements, the values of the index are rather
stable. But how are the qualitative and quantitative
features of information-sharing arrangements relat-
ed to each other? Figure 2 captures the maximum
coverage by either the private credit bureau or the
public credit registry (x-axis) and the depth of credit
information index (y-axis).The Figure shows no rela-
tion between these two different characteristics of
information sharing.
Further improving the measurement
In contrast to many other institutional features, there
are both quantitative and qualitative indicators for
the extent of information sharing. This provides a
very good basis for research.The depth of the credit
information index summarizes six different features
of the information-sharing arrangement, including
whether positive or negative information is distrib-
uted.In the literature it has been shown that it matters
whether positive or negative information is shared.
Therefore, it would be helpful if data underlying the
depth of credit information index and how they have
changed since the start of the survey became pub-
licly available so that this information can easily be
used for research.
The Doing Business data are unique since they cover
most countries and have been available since 2005.
Previously Jappelli and Pagano (2002) made the ef-
fort to collect data on selected countries.Interesting-
ly,for some countries the Doing Business figures and
their figures diverge significantly. For instance, for
Denmark Jappelli and Pagano
(2002) report for the year 1996 a
coverage by private credit bureaus
of 50.3 percent whereas it was
only 7.1 percent in the Doing Bu-
siness database in 2005 and went
down to 5.2 percent in 2010. For
Italy, Jappelli and Pagano report
that in 1996 4.6 percent were cov-
ered by private credit bureaus
whereas it is 77.5 percent accord-
ing to the Doing Business data
for 2005. The change for Italy is
most likely due to an increase in
coverage as was shown for other
countries in our sample (see Ta-
ble).However,it is surprising that
the coverage by private credit bureaus went down
in some countries (for example, in Denmark). The
difference might be related to the way the coverage
is calculated. When more than one credit bureau
operates in a country, their coverage rates must 
be aggregated. The method used for aggregation
might differ between Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
and World Bank (2010). Thus, it would be helpful
if more details on the method of aggregation were
provided.
In order to create value,the credit bureaus/registries
must, of course, provide reliable and correct infor-
mation. Their reputation will suffer if inaccuracies
occur and data quality is poor. In emerging markets
complaints about the reliability of information are
more frequently found (for Russia, see Skogoreva
2005), but this problem is receiving more and more
attention in economies with well-developed institu-
tions as well (for the US,see Cassady and Mierzwinski
2004 or for Germany, see Bundesministerium 2009).
Due to the nature of the problem,it is difficult to meas-
ure the mistakes on a comprehensive basis.However,
there have been more and more attempts to evaluate
the degree to which data are misreported. In a very
small control sample of the biggest credit bureau in
Germany, data were missing or wrong in more than
40 percent of the cases (Bundesministerium 2009).It
would be helpful if these data were collected on an
international basis and made available for research.
One way to improve data quality is to have regula-
tions that guarantee the population the right to access
their data,which would allow them to detect mistakes
and report them. Actually, the depth of credit in-
formation index captures this regulatory provision,
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Figure 2In most of the 36 countries we look at there is some
information-sharing arrangement in place.However,
in many less developed countries, this institution is
still missing.An important piece of information about
a firm’s creditworthiness is whether it is bankrupt.
This information is made publicly available. In this
particular aspect, information-sharing arrangements
and a registry recording that a firm is bankrupt are
substitutes. In some countries the information about
bankrupt firms is accessible online and thus should
be readily available.It would be interesting to collect
more information about the way in which the fact
that a firm is bankrupt is made public as it influences
creditors and ultimately the whole credit market
(Hainz 2009).
Information-sharing arrangements and research
Information-sharing arrangements are one of the
important institutions that significantly influence the
functioning of the credit market. The availability of
qualitative and quantitative measures of informa-
tion-sharing arrangements for a large set of coun-
tries has made it possible to analyze this institution.
But not only the indicators of the information-shar-
ing arrangements are used for research. Credit bu-
reaus or registries also provide an often excellent
database for research, depending on what features
are collected about the borrower and potential indi-
vidual loans and loan applications.There are already
some important studies using data from the Spanish
public credit registry. These studies have investigat-
ed,for instance,how access to credit and the terms of
a credit contract are influenced by firm- and bank-
specific characteristics but also how macroeconomic
conditions and monetary policy influence them
(Jiménez and Saurina 2004; Jiménez et al. 2009 and
2010).Also for developing countries data from pub-
lic credit registries can be very insightful. Ioannidou
and Ongena (2010), for instance, use data from the
Bolivian credit registry to show how a bank relation-
ship influences lending conditions over time. For
Pakistan, there is evidence that Islamic loans default
less often (Baele et al. 2010).
In these examples, there is one central and public
credit registry covering a broad universe of borrow-
ers. In most OECD countries, however, there are sev-
eral firms operating private credit bureaus. It would
therefore be interesting to learn how competition
between private providers of information-sharing ar-
rangements influences the market outcome. More-
over, the factors driving the development of infor-
mation-sharing arrangements are not yet properly
understood. These questions are only two examples
of what can be investigated in future research.
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